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1An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Risk Aversion
in Executive Compensation Contracts
Abstract. This paper empirically tests the principal-agent model prediction that the use of
performance measures for incentive purposes is affected by the agent’s risk aversion. We find
that the use of both accounting and market performance measures in executive compensation
contracts decreases as the level of risk aversions increases. We further find that agent-specific
characteristics, i.e., risk aversion, become more important in designing executive
compensation contracts when performance measures are less useful due to measure-specific
characteristics.
Key Words: Risk aversion, agency theory, executive compensation.
2The use of accounting and market performance measures in executive compensation contracts
has received considerable attention in the accounting literature. Agency theory predicts that in
order to provide incentives, management compensation should be linked to measures of
performance that are informative about the effort provided by managers (Holmström, 1979).
Analytical studies in accounting indicate that both accounting and market performance
measures are informative and should therefore be used for incentive purposes (e.g., Bushman
and Indjejikian, 1993; Feltham and Xie, 1994). These studies further show that the incentive
weight of a performance measure depends on measure-specific characteristics and agent-
specific characteristics (e.g., Banker and Datar, 1989; Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993)
The empirical accounting literature has tried to examine to what extent the agency
theory predictions can explain observed practices. This research shows that CEO
compensation is on average related to both accounting performance and stock performance
(e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993; Baber et al., 1999). Furthermore, studies that
aim to explain the cross-sectional differences in the use of performance measures, find that
the use of accounting performance measures decreases relative to the use of market
performance measures when its relative noise increases (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987) and
when the firm’s growth opportunities increase (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Baber et al.,
1996). In general, these studies focus on firm characteristics (measure-specific characteristics)
of which agency theory predicts that these affect the use of performance measures in
compensation contracts. However, agency theory also predicts that the use of performance
measures depends on agent-specific characteristics, i.e. the risk aversion of the agent.
However, no attempt has been made so far to empirically examine the effect of risk aversion
on the use of performance measures for incentive purposes.
The relationship between risk aversion and the use of performance measures in
compensation contracts is especially relevant at the CEO level where contracts are more
3tailor-made. Discussions in the economics literature indicate that the assumed lack of pay-for-
performance at the CEO level, as described by Jensen and Murphy (1990), is more illusory
than real taking into account the effect of risk aversion (e.g., Haubrich, 1994). The central
message from these discussions is that, although the pay-performance sensitivity might be
small due to the risk aversion of the agent, it still can provide significant incentives. This
indicates that risk aversion can have a significant effect on the use of performance measures
for incentive purposes. In order to get a better understanding of the use of (accounting)
performance measures in CEO compensation contracts, it is therefore important to empirically
examine the effect of risk aversion.
Building on the linear principal-agent model of Holmström and Milgrom (1987), this
study identifies proxies for managerial risk aversion that can be measured using publicly
available executive compensation data. The theoretical analysis indicates that two proxies are
worthy of attention, i.e., (1) the variance of compensation and (2) mean compensation divided
by variance of compensation. The first proxy is based on the assumption that risk averse
managers prefer less risk to more risk. Therefore, if the principal-agent model is descriptive of
observed practices, the variance of compensation should be lower for more risk averse
managers. The assumption underlying the second proxy is that risk averse managers demand a
risk premium. Therefore, the ratio of the mean compensation to the variance of compensation
should be higher for more risk averse managers.
We empirically examine the effect of the two risk aversion proxies on the sensitivity
of compensation to performance after controlling for other economic determinants. The
empirical results provide strong support for the principal-agent model predictions. First,
consistent with previous research, we find that the use of accounting performance measures
for incentive purposes decreases with its relative noise and the existence of growth
opportunities. The use of market performance measures also decreases with its relative noise
4but is not affected by growth opportunities. Additional tests indicate that this latter finding
can be explained by an increased use of stock-based compensation rather than cash
compensation when growth opportunities increase.
Second, the empirical results show that the use of both accounting and market
performance measures decreases as the level of risk aversion increases. Further, the impact of
risk aversion on the use of accounting performance measures increases as the relative noise
increases and/or the growth opportunities increase. This implies that as accounting
performance measures become less useful due to measure-specific characteristics, the impact
of agent-specific characteristics, i.e., risk aversion, on the use of these performance measures
increases. Overall, the results suggest that risk aversion plays an important role in the design
of executive compensation contracts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we describe the
theoretical model that underlies our theoretical and empirical analysis. In section 2, we
develop two risk aversion proxies based on our theoretical model. In section 3, we present the
empirical results using the risk aversion proxies and perform several sensitivity analyses and
additional tests. Section 4 concludes this paper with some additional comments and directions
for further research.
1. Theoretical Model
To facilitate our analysis, we use a simple linear principal-agent model (Holmström and
Milgrom, 1987). The model contains the following assumptions. There is a risk neutral
principal who hires a risk and work averse agent to ‘run the firm’. The principal is interested
in maximizing the gross-payoff to the firm x, characterized by
ε+= ex (1)
where e is managerial effort and ε is the random shock affecting the gross-payoff. This gross-
payoff is assumed to be noncontractible (cf. Feltham and Xie, 1994). The agent has a negative
5exponential utility function over wealth. The effort aversion of the agent is reflected by his
personal cost of effort, characterized by
2
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The principal designs a linear incentive contract based on performance measure y, i.e.,
yys βα +=)( (3)
where α is a fixed salary and β is the incentive weight. Performance measure y is
characterized by
θ+= fey (4)
where 0<f≤1 is the marginal contribution of managerial effort to performance measure y and θ
is the random shock that affects y, with θ ~ N(0,σ²). The principal’s problem can be
formulated as follows
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Solving the principal’s problem leads to the following incentive weight
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This equation shows that the incentive weight is a function of the sensitivity of the
performance measure to managerial effort, the noise of the performance measure, and the
level of managerial risk aversion. Differentiating the incentive weight with respect to each of
the above parameters leads to proposition 1.
Proposition 1: differentiating the incentive weight (β) with respect to the sensitivity of the
performance measure to managerial effort (f), performance measure noise (σ²), and risk
aversion (r) leads to
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Proposition 1 states that the incentive weight is a decreasing function of performance measure
noise and managerial risk aversion. Furthermore, the incentive weight is an increasing
function of the sensitivity of the performance measure to managerial effort if f²<σ². That is,
the incentive weight increases with sensitivity if the following assumptions apply:
1. the agent is risk averse to some extent (see e.g., Lambert et al. (1991) for
empirical evidence); and
2. the incentive weight is less than 0.5. That is, the performance measure is not
‘owned’ by the agent and most of the output accrues to the principal (see e.g.,
Jensen and Murphy (1990) for empirical evidence).
Under these assumptions, f²<σ² and the incentive weight increases with the degree to which
the performance measure is sensitive to the level of effort.
2. Risk Aversion Proxies
The principal-agent model and the predictions it makes can be used to indicate how
empirically observable variables can proxy for the level of risk aversion of the agent. The
empirical researcher is able to observe the average level of compensation and the variance of
compensation. The following analysis shows how these empirically observable measures can
be used to approximate the level of managerial risk aversion.
Assume that there exist two types of agents, extremely risk averse (r→∞) and close to
risk neutral (r→0). The extremely risk averse agent has the following incentive weight
0
lim
=
∞→r
β (8)
7That is, the incentive weight is zero, which means that he receives a fixed salary and the
variance of compensation is zero. For the close to risk neutral agent, on the other hand, the
incentive weight is as follows
1
0lim
≥
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β (9)
That is, the incentive weight is at least 1, which implies that the variance of compensation at
least equals the variance of the performance measure. As a result, given the predictions of the
principal-agent model, we can gain information about the risk aversion of agents by
empirically observing the variance of compensation.
To explain this result more formally, we calculate comparative static predictions about
the effect of risk aversion on the variance of compensation. The variance of compensation is
defined by β²σ². Therefore, given the optimal incentive weight, the variance of compensation
equals
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which can be rewritten into
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The effect of risk aversion on the variance of compensation can be determined by
differentiating Var[C] with respect to r, which leads to Observation 1.
Observation 1: the partial derivative of Var[C] to r is characterized by
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Observation 1 shows that the variance of compensation decreases as the level of risk aversion
increases.
Further, the linear principal-agent model indicates that the certainty equivalent of the
agent (CEA) equals the agent’s expected compensation minus the risk premium, i.e.,
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Without loss of generality, we can assume that the agent’s reservation utility equals zero,
which means that CEA equals zero. As a result, the CEA can be rewritten into
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Note, however, that the expected compensation E[C] includes the agent’s personal cost of
effort, which is empirically unobservable. The only component of E[C] that can be
empirically observed is the expected value of the linear incentive contract E[s(y)]. Given the
optimal solution to the principal-agent model, the expected value of the incentive contract can
be written as (see appendix)
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Therefore, the ratio of E[s(y)] to Var[C] is characterized by
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Observation 2: the partial derivative of (E[s(y)] / Var[C]) to r is characterized by
0])[/)]([( >
∂
∂
r
CVarysE (17)
Observation 2 indicates that the ratio of E[s(y)] to Var[C] increases as the level of risk
aversion increases.
In sum, the previous analysis indicates that measures of the variance of compensation
and the mean over variance of compensation can be used as proxies for the level of
managerial risk aversion.
3. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we empirically investigate whether risk aversion has an effect on the
compensation-performance relation, as predicted by the principal-agent model. More
9specifically, Proposition 1 states that the higher the level of risk aversion the lower will be the
incentive weight. Applying this to the use of both accounting measures of performance and
market measures of performance leads to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The sensitivity of compensation to accounting performance is negatively
affected by the level of managerial risk aversion.
Hypothesis 2: The sensitivity of compensation to market performance is negatively affected by
the level of managerial risk aversion.
In testing the above hypotheses, we control for two other economic determinants of the
compensation-performance relationship used in previous research (e.g., Lambert and Larcker,
1987; Baber et al., 1996). More specifically, we control for the impact of sensitivity and noise
on the incentive weight. First, we control for the growth opportunities of the firm by using the
market-to-book ratio. We expect that the use of accounting (market) performance measures
decreases (increases) with the market-to-book ratio because the relative sensitivity of
accounting (market) performance measures decreases (increases) as the growth opportunities
increase (cf. Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Baber et al., 1996). Second, we control for the noise
in accounting and market performance measures by adding the variable relative noise of the
performance measures. We expect that the use of performance measures decreases with its
relative noise (cf. Lambert and Larcker, 1987).
3.1 Data and Sample Selection
We obtain CEO compensation and firm performance data from the ExecuComp
database for the years 1992-1999. CEO compensation data and data on accounting
performance and stock returns for five consecutive years within the period 1992-1999 are
available for 955 CEOs.1 We remove the years in which the executive became CEO or, if the
exact date is not available, the first year for which ExecuComp reports the CEO’s
compensation data. In order to reduce the influence of outlier observations, we also remove
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observations with |ΔROE| ≥ 100%. These large changes in Return on Equity are generally
caused by low values of stockholders’ equity due to extreme losses in the previous fiscal
years. Deletion of partial-year CEOs and observations with |ΔROE| ≥ 100% yields a total
sample of 862 CEOs and 3,448 firm-year observations.
Panel A of table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the firm-year observations
of CEO compensation and firm performance. The average total cash compensation of the
CEOs is $1,382,000, which consists of an average salary of $654,000 and an average bonus of
$729,000. The average firm performance in terms of ΔROE (RET) is -0.3% (19.3%). Panel B
of table 1 provides the descriptive statistics with respect to the firm-specific observations of
the risk aversion, noise, and growth opportunities proxies. The two risk aversion proxies have
the following definitions. First, we measure the variance proxy (COMPVAR) by calculating
the five-year variance of total cash compensation. Second, we measure the mean-over-
variance proxy (MEANVAR) as the ratio of the five-year mean of total cash compensation to
the five-year variance of total cash compensation. The mean of COMPVAR (MEANVAR)
equals $410 million (0.425).
The volatility of accounting performance (ROEVOL) and market performance
(RETVOL) is measured by the five-year standard deviation of ΔROE and the five-year
standard deviation of annual stock returns, respectively. The mean of ROEVOL (RETVOL)
equals 6.9% (38.2%). In conformity with Lambert and Larcker (1987), we measure the
relative noise of accounting performance measures (RELNOISE) by the ratio of ROEVOL to
RETVOL, which averages 0.232. Finally, we use the average market-to-book ratio (MTB)
over five consecutive years as a proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities. The average MTB
equals 3.036.
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------------
Insert table 1 about here
------------
As can be inferred from table 1, the empirical distributions of the risk aversion, noise
and growth opportunities proxies are skewed. Therefore, we transform these variables into
ranks between 0 and 1. This ranking procedure has several advantages other than eliminating
the skewness in the distribution. First, the information content of the rank-transformed
variables is similar to that of the original variables. Second, because the ranks represent the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the variables, we can compute the pay-performance
sensitivity for any point on the distribution of the variables (cf. Aggarwal and Samwick
1999), which allows an interpretation of the incentive weights for different combinations of
the economic determinants.
The rank-transformation for both risk aversion proxies is such that a higher rank
implies higher risk aversion. Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the
economic determinants.
------------
Insert table 2 about here
------------
3.2 Specification of Empirical Model
To test the principal-agent model predictions, we examine the following three regression
models.
Δln(Compit) =α0 + α1ΔROEit + α2RETit + α3RELNOISEi + α4MTBi
+ α5(ΔROEit∗RELNOISEi) +  α6(RETit∗RELNOISEi)
+ α7(ΔROEit∗MTBi) + α8(RETit∗MTBi) + eit (M1)
Δln(Compit) =α0 + α1ΔROEit + α2RETit + α3RELNOISEi + α4MTBi + α5COMPVARi
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+ α6(ΔROEit∗RELNOISEi) +  α7(RETit∗RELNOISEi)
+ α8(ΔROEit∗MTBi) + α9(RETit∗MTBi) +
+ α10(ΔROEit∗COMPVARi) + α11(RETit∗COMPVARi) + eit (M2)
Δln(Compit) =α0 + α1ΔROEit + α2RETit + α3RELNOISEi + α4MTBi + α5MEANVARi
+ α6(ΔROEit∗RELNOISEi) +  α7(RETit∗RELNOISEi)
+ α8(ΔROEit∗MTBi) + α9(RETit∗MTBi) +
+ α10(ΔROEit∗MEANVARi) + α11(RETit∗MEANVARi) + eit (M3)
where
Δln(Compit) = year t-1 to year t change in the natural log of CEOs’ total cash
compensation;
ΔROEit = year t-1 to year t change in net income before extraordinary items
scaled by common equity;
RETit = year t-1 to year t change in stock price plus dividends scaled by year
t-1 stock price;
RELNOISEi = ROEVOL scaled by RETVOL (rank-transformed);
MTBi = the mean ratio of the market value of common equity to the book
value of common equity measured over five consecutive years (rank-
transformed);
COMPVARi = the variance of CEO cash compensation measured over five
consecutive years (inverted and then rank-transformed);
MEANVARi = the mean of CEO cash compensation over five consecutive years
scaled by the variance of CEO cash compensation over the same period
(rank-transformed).
We perform a pooled cross-sectional analysis over the time period 1992-1999. To accept
hypotheses 1 and 2, the regression coefficients α10 and α11 in model 2 (M2) and model 3 (M3)
13
should be significantly negative. Negative values for α10 and α11 imply that the relationship
between compensation and performance decreases as risk aversion increases.
3.3 Empirical Results
Table 2 summarizes the results of the regression analysis for all three models. The results for
model 1 (M1) indicate that the relationship between changes in cash compensation and ΔROE
decreases with RELNOISE and MTB. This suggests that the use of accounting performance
measures for determining CEO’s cash compensation decreases as its relative noise increases
and the growth opportunities increase. These results are consistent with previous research
(e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987) and provide further empirical evidence of the relevance of
these economic determinants. Furthermore, the interaction between RET and RELNOISE is
significantly positive, while the interaction between RET and MTB is not significant.
Therefore, the use of stock returns for determining CEO’s cash compensation increases as the
relative noise in accounting earnings increases but is not affected by growth opportunities. A
plausible explanation for this latter finding is that as growth opportunities increase, the use of
stock-based compensation increases rather than the use of stock returns in CEO’s cash
compensation. We examine this possibility in section 3.5.
The results for model 2 (M2) show that the relationship between changes in cash
compensation and both ΔROE and RET decreases as COMPVAR increases, which implies
that the use of both accounting performance measures and market performance measures
decreases as risk aversion increases. The last column of table 2 shows the results of the
regression analysis using MEANVAR as a proxy for risk aversion (model 3 (M3)). These
results indicate that the relationship between changes in cash compensation and both ΔROE
and RET decreases as MEANVAR increases. Similar to COMPVAR, these results suggest
that the use of performance measures decreases as risk aversion increases. Although
MEANVAR seems to slightly outperform COMPVAR, the results suggest that the variance in
14
compensation predominately determines the ranking in risk aversion, while the mean of
compensation makes some minor adjustments to this ranking. Finally, in both model 2 and 3,
the results with respect to the interactions between ΔROE (RET) and RELNOISE and MTB
are identical to those in model 1.
In sum, the empirical results suggest that the use of both accounting and market
performance measures for determining CEO’s cash compensation decreases as the level of
managerial risk aversion increases. Therefore, the results provide strong support for
hypotheses 1 and 2. Furthermore, the use of accounting performance measures decreases with
its relative noise and the existence of growth opportunities, while the use of market
performance measures increases as the relative noise in accounting earnings increases.
------------
Insert table 3 about here
------------
3.4 Economic Determinants and the Use of Accounting Performance Measures
In order to get a better understanding of how the economic determinants simultaneously affect
the use of accounting performance measures, we compute the incentive weight of ΔROE for
different combinations of RELNOISE, MTB, and MEANVAR.2 Using the empirical results
of model 3, we compute the different incentive weights by filling in three different values,
i.e., 0, 0.5, and 1, for all three economic determinants. The three different values represent
respectively the lowest, median, and highest observed values of the economic determinants.
This procedure yields 27 coefficients (incentive weights), which are presented in table 4.
A number of inferences can be drawn from table 4. First, the results show that,
consistent with agency theory, the incentive weights are highest when both RELNOISE and
MTB are low. In these circumstances, accounting performance measures are highly sensitive
and relatively precise and are therefore most useful for incentive purposes. The results suggest
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that, for the median level of risk aversion, a one percentage-point increase in ROE leads to a
2.3% increase in cash compensation. In contrast, when both RELNOISE and MTB are high,
the results indicate that accounting performance measures are not used for incentive purposes.
Second, the characterization of the incentive weight in section 1 (equation 7) implies
that the same incentive weight can be found for different combinations of the performance
measure properties and the level of risk aversion. Table 4 indicates that for the median level
of RELNOISE, MTB and MEANVAR, the incentive weight is approximately one, which
implies that a one percentage-point increase in ROE leads to a 1% increase in cash
compensation. Approximately the same incentive weight applies to the situation where
RELNOISE is high (low), MTB is low (high), and MEANVAR is low (high). Although these
last two situations are each other’s opposites with respect to sensitivity, noise, and the level of
risk aversion, the use of accounting performance measures for incentive purposes is identical.
These results stress the importance of examining multiple determinants and their interactions.
Finally, the relative impact of MEANVAR on the use of accounting performance
measure increases with increases in RELNOISE and/or MTB up to the point where
accounting performance are not used anymore, i.e., when both RELNOISE and MTB are
high. This suggests that when accounting performance measures become less sensitive and/or
noisier, the relative impact of risk aversion on the incentive weight increases. For example,
when both RELNOISE and MTB are low, the incentive weight for low MEANVAR is 37%
higher than the incentive weight for high MEANVAR. In contrast, when RELNOISE is high
and MTB is low, the incentive weight for low MEANVAR is almost three times the incentive
weight for high MEANVAR. Similarly, at the median RELNOISE and high MTB, the
incentive weight for low MEANVAR is almost four times the incentive weight for high
MEANVAR. Our theoretical interpretation of this finding is the following. When accounting
performance measures are relatively precise, the role of risk aversion is relatively low since
16
the performance measure imposes few risks on the manager. However, when the performance
measure becomes noisier, the risk imposed on the manager increases and, as a result, the level
of risk aversion determines to what extent the manager can cope with these risks, which
affects the incentive weight. With respect to the effect of MTB, our interpretation is the
following. When growth opportunities increase, managers need to make riskier investments
and more long-term oriented decisions. In general, managers who are risk averse are reluctant
to make these investments and decisions. These managers should therefore not be
compensated based on accounting performance measures, since this would make them even
more reluctant. Although this effect might also apply to managers who are characterized by
low levels of risk aversion, the impact is likely to be much smaller, which makes the use of
accounting performance measures in these circumstances less problematic. On the other hand,
when growth opportunities are low, the above tradeoff becomes less relevant and therefore the
impact of risk aversion decreases.
------------
Insert table 4 about here
------------
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In the previous analyses, we used the variance in cash compensation to determine the level of
risk aversion. We interpret the result that a lower variance is related to a lower pay-for-
performance as evidence of the prediction that increased risk aversion decreases the incentive
weight. However, if substitution effects between different components of compensation are
present, then a lower variance in cash compensation might not be due to increased risk
aversion but due to a substitution of cash compensation by, for example, stock-based
compensation. Although the presence of a substitution effect will not affect the empirical
results, it will result in a different interpretation of the results.
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In order to examine whether there are substitution effects, we correlate the risk
aversion proxies with the CEO’s stake in the firm (STAKE) and the variance in the value of
stock options granted to the CEO (OPTIONS).3 If the examined companies substitute options
or shares for cash compensation, the correlation between the risk aversion proxies and both
STAKE and OPTIONS should be significantly positive. Table 5 presents the Pearson
correlation coefficients between the different variables. The results indicate that the
correlation between the risk aversion proxies and OPTIONS is significantly negative, while
the correlation between the proxies and STAKE is not significant. This suggests that the
different components of compensation are not used as substitutes and therefore substitution
effects cannot explain our results.
------------
Insert table 5 about here
------------
The results in table 3 further showed that the interaction between MTB and RET is
insignificant, which implies that, contrary to our expectations, the use of stock returns in
determining CEO’s cash compensation is not affected by the existence of growth
opportunities. This insignificant interaction might be due to an increased use of stock-based
compensation when growth opportunities increase. To examine this possibility, we correlate
MTB with STAKE. The results show that the correlation between MTB and STAKE is 0.466
(p<0.01). This significant positive correlation provides some evidence that if growth
opportunities increase, there is a stronger link between CEO’s compensation and stock
performance through an increased use of stock-based compensation (cf. Smith and Watts,
1992).4
Our theoretical model predicts that increased risk aversion decreases the incentive
weight, which consequently decreases the variance of compensation. The question arises of
18
whether the relationship between the incentive weight and variance of compensation will exist
even if the incentive weight is not determined by risk aversion. That is, if our theoretical
model is not empirically valid and factors that are not taken into account in our model
determine the incentive weight, does the variance of compensation still increase with
increases in the incentive weight? If so, then our empirical results could be an artifact based
on a deterministic relationship. To test whether our results can be artificially determined, we
use the following procedure. We estimate the following basic compensation-performance
regression
Δln(Compit) =α0 + α1ΔROEit + α2RETit + eit (18)
Subsequently, we determine a normal distribution for the incentive weights based on the mean
regression coefficients and their standard error. We then randomly assign incentive weights
from this normal distribution to the 862 managers, randomly allocate the 3,448 empirically
obtained residuals and calculate 3,448 changes in cash compensation based on actual
observations of ΔROE and RET. Taking the actual compensation in the first of the five years
(that was not included in the regression analysis due to differencing), we predict for each
manager the level of cash compensation in the following four years using the calculated
changes in cash compensation. Finally, we calculate the risk aversion proxy COMPVAR
based on the predicted compensation data and estimate equation (18) adding two interaction
terms, i.e., ΔROEit∗COMPVARi and RETit∗COMPVARi. In estimating the equation, we use
the predicted changes in compensation, actual accounting performance and stock
performance, and the risk aversion proxy based on predicted compensation. The results based
on 500 iterations show that the regression coefficients for the interaction between the risk
aversion proxy and respectively ΔROE and RET are not significant. These insignificant
interactions lead us to reject the possibility that our empirical results are artificially
determined.
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3.6 Alternative Explanation
In the empirical analysis we tested the theoretical prediction that incentive weights increase
with decreases in risk aversion. The significant interactions that we find in the empirical
analysis are consistent with this explanation. However, an alternative explanation for the
significant interactions might be that incentive contracts are nonlinear and more convex for
less risk averse managers. This increase in convexity with decreases in risk aversion will
statistically also lead to significant interactions. To test whether increased convexity rather
than increased incentive weights can explain our results, we perform the following test. We
split the sample based on deciles of MEANVAR and estimate for each of the ten subsamples
the following compensation-performance relationship using Box-Cox transformation (cf.
Lambert and Larcker, 1987)
B(ct,λ) – B(ct-1,λ) = β0 + β1ΔROEt + β2RETt + νt (19)
where B(ct,λ) is the Box-Cox transformation of ct, which denotes the level of cash
compensation in year t divided by the company-specific five-year average of cash
compensation, with λ indicating the level of convexity. We apply the following Box-Cox
transformation:
B(ct,λ) = [ctλ – 1] / λ when λ ≠ 0 (20)
B(ct,λ) = log(ct) when λ = 0 (21)
In the estimation procedure, we let λ vary from –1.0 to 3.0 with increments of 0.05. If the
convexity of incentive contracts drives our results, the parameter λ should increase with
increases in MEANVAR, i.e., risk aversion.
Figure 1 graphically shows the different λs for the ten subgroups of risk aversion. The
results indicate that λ does not gradually increase with increases in risk aversion. Further, for
seven out of ten subgroups, the confidence interval includes λ=1, which implies linearity.
However, we do find that the compensation-performance relationship is convex for the lowest
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two deciles of risk aversion, while it is concave for the highest decile. Although it is unlikely
that this finding drives our original results, we re-estimate model 2 and 3 using the data of the
seven deciles for which λ=1 is in the confidence interval. The results (not reported) are
quantitatively similar to those presented in table 3. Overall, the results suggest that, although
we observe non-linearities in the extremes of risk aversion, these non-linearities do not drive
our results and we therefore conclude that our empirical findings cannot be explained by
changes in the convexity of incentive contracts.
------------
Insert figure 1 about here
------------
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the role of risk aversion in executive compensation contracts. The
empirical results provide strong support for the principal-agent model prediction that the use
of performance measures for incentive purposes decreases as risk aversion increases. The
results further show that, consistent with the principal-agent model prediction, measure-
specific characteristics and agent-specific characteristics simultaneously determine the
incentive weight. Finally, the empirical results indicate that the impact of risk aversion on the
incentive weight increases as the performance measure becomes less sensitive and/or noisier.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we provide strong evidence of the
relevance of incorporating risk aversion in executive compensation research. The results
indicate that risk aversion has a significant effect on the use of performance measures, which
suggests that future executive compensation research should therefore take the level of risk
aversion into account. Second, the risk aversion proxies that we test are robust, simple, and
can easily be measured using publicly available data. As a result, these proxies can be used in
future accounting research other than in the executive compensation area. Areas in which the
21
risk aversion measures can be applied are, for example, earnings management, CEOs’
financing and investment decisions, and voluntary disclosure issues.
Appendix: Proofs
The expected value of the incentive contracts can be determined as follows. The certainty
equivalent of the agent (CEA) is characterized by
)(
22
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Replacing y by fe leads to
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Filling in the optimal effort level, i.e., e* = βf, results in
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Replacing β by the characterization of the optimal incentive weight, i.e., equation 7, leads to
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By setting the CEA equal to zero, we can solve for α
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Given this characterization of the fixed wage, the expected value of the incentive contract
equals
22
22222
222
][
)(2
)()]([ f
rf
f
rf
rffysE
σσ
σ
+
+
+
−
−= ,
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Median
Lower
Quartile
Upper
Quartile
Panel A: Firm-year observations (N=3,448)
Cash salary 654 337 600 429 819
Cash bonus 729 1,134 415 134 853
Total compensation 1,382 1,320 1,024 650 1,635
∆ROE -0.003 0.122 0.001 -0.034 0.029
RET 0.193 0.501 0.137 -0.088 0.386
Panel B: Firm-specific observations (N=862)
COMPVAR (millions) 410 2,203 52 15 173
MEANVAR 0.425 9.588 0.018 0.008 0.051
ROEVOL 0.069 0.069 0.047 0.023 0.088
RETVOL 0.382 0.297 0.314 0.218 0.439
RELNOISE 0.232 0.329 0.144 0.071 0.277
MTB 3.036 2.378 2.325 1.660 3.522
Variable definition:
∆ROE = the change in net income before extraordinary items scaled by common equity.
RET = the annual change in stock price plus dividends scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year.
COMPVAR = the variance in CEO cash compensation measured over five consecutive years.
MEANVAR = the mean of CEO cash compensation over five consecutive years scaled by the
variance of CEO cash compensation over the same period.
ROEVOL = the standard deviation of Return on Equity (net income before extraordinary items scaled by common
equity) measured over five consecutive years.
RETVOL = the standard deviation of annual stock returns measured over five consecutive years.
RELNOISE = ROEVOL scaled by RETVOL.
MTB = the mean of the market value of common equity scaled by the book value of common
equity measured over five consecutive years.
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Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients among rank-transformed variables (p-values are in
parentheses).
COMPVAR MEANVAR RELNOISE
MEANVAR 0.961
(<0.01)
RELNOISE -0.097
(<0.01)
-0.097
(<0.01)
MTB -0.169
(<0.01)
-0.121
(<0.01)
0.047
(0.17)
Notes:
The variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 3. OLS regression analysis of the effect of risk aversion proxies on the relationship
between performance measures and compensation (White-adjusted t-statistics are in
parentheses)
Risk aversion proxy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent variables
Basic regression
equation COMPVAR MEANVAR
Intercept 0.058
(3.30)***
0.071
(2.98)***
0.081
(3.38)***
∆ROE 2.466
(7.02)***
2.702
(6.32)***
2.608
(6.54)***
RET 0.160
(1.82)*
0.282
(3.72)***
0.265
(3.24)***
∆ROE * RELNOISE -1.748
(-4.00)***
-1.608
(-3.69)***
-1.538
(-3.63)***
RET * RELNOISE 0.182
(2.27)**
0.154
(2.04)**
0.165
(2.03)**
∆ROE * MTB -0.927
(-4.07)***
-0.948
(-4.27)***
-0.892
(-3.90)***
RET * MTB -0.114
(-1.08)
-0.154
(-1.63)
-0.145
(-1.43)
∆ROE * Risk aversion -0.686
(-2.40)**
-0.706
(-2.53)**
RET * Risk aversion -0.192
(-1.84)**
-0.197
(-1.85)**
F-value 88.44*** 73.89*** 74.37***
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.189 0.190
(Continued on next page)
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(Table 3 continued)
Notes:
***, **, * is statistically significant at respectively the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed). Coefficients on the risk
aversion proxies, RELNOISE and MTB are included in the regression but not separately reported. The
independent variables (except ∆ROE and RET) are rank-transformed variables.
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Table 4. The use of accounting performance measures for different combinations of
RELNOISE, MTB, and MEANVAR.
RELNOISE
MTB Low Median High
Low
Low MEANVAR
Median MEANVAR
High MEANVAR
2.608
2.255
1.902
1.839
1.486
1.133
1.070
0.717
0.364
Median
Low MEANVAR
Median MEANVAR
High MEANVAR
2.162
1.809
1.456
1.393
1.040
0.687
0.624
0.271
       -0.082
High
Low MEANVAR
Median MEANVAR
High MEANVAR
1.716
1.363
1.010
0.947
0.594
0.241
0.178
       -0.175
       -0.528
Notes:
The variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficients among rank-transformed variables (p-values are in
parentheses).
COMPVAR MEANVAR OPTIONS
OPTIONS -0.572
(<0.01)
-0.491
(<0.01)
STAKE -0.049
(0.15)
-0.035
(0.31)
0.245
(<0.01)
Notes:
OPTIONS = the five-year variance in the value of stock options granted to the CEO. Options are valued using the
Black & Scholes method (as reported by ExecuComp).
STAKE = the five-year mean of the end-of-the-year market value of the company’s common shares owned by the
CEO plus the end-of-the-year value of exercisable and non-exercisable in-the-money options scaled by the CEO’s
annual cash compensation.
The remaining variables are defined in Table 1. The reported variables are rank-transformed variables.
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λHIGH 0.55 0.80 1.25 1.15 1.30 1.15 1.30 1.35 1.70 2.90
λ* 0.40 0.60 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.75 0.85 0.80 1.00 2.10
λLOW 0.25 0.35 0.70 0.70 0.55 0.40 0.35 0.25 0.30 1.35
Figure 1. The optimal level of λ and confidence intervals for deciles of risk aversion. Lower
values of λ imply greater convexity and λ=1 implies linearity. Decile 1 (10) is the lowest
(highest) risk aversion group. λ*, λHIGH, and λLOW denote the optimal level of λ, the upper 95
percent confidence limit, and the lower 95 percent confidence limit, respectively.
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Endnotes
                                                
1 If more than five years of data are available, we use the data for the last five years.
2 The results are identical when COMPVAR is used.
3 STAKE is measured as the five-year mean of the end-of-the-year market value of the company’s common
shares owned by the CEO plus the end-of-the-year value of exercisable and non-exercisable in-the-money
options scaled by the CEO’s annual cash compensation. OPTIONS is measured as the five-year variance in the
value of stock options granted to the CEO, where the options are valued using the Black & Scholes method (as
reported by ExecuComp). Both STAKE and OPTIONS are rank-transformed.
4 Note that this result does not indicate a substitution effect between different components of compensation.
Since the use of stock returns in determining CEO’s cash compensation is not affected by MTB, it can be
concluded that CEOs receive additional incentives when growth opportunities increase. As a result, the use of
stock-based compensation is complementary to the use of cash compensation.
